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I. Introduction
As environmental problems related to natural resource
utilization and industrial processes receive wider attention
and public scrutiny, a comparison of public policy and
private practice in different countries engaged in similar
activities has become a useful way to evaluate the relative
effectiveness of pollution control policies. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 1 presents an excellent opportunity to
implement this kind of policy comparison. The Exxon Valdez
oil spill in 1989 highlighted deficiencies in the Trans
Alaska Pipeline System's (TAPS) marine operation on both
regulatory and operational levels. 2 The United States
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to promote the
prevention of oil spills and to improve our ability to
mitigate the effects of spills that occur. Title V of the
1. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. sees. 2701-2753
(1990) .
2. Alaska Oil Spill Commission. 1990. Spill: The Wreck of
the Exxon Valdez, Implications of Safe Marine
Transportation. p 2. State of Alaska, Oil Spill Information
Center, 645 G St., Anchorage, Alaska, 99501.
1
Act, the IIp rince William Sound Provi s ions ,,3 provides for,
among other things, the establishment of oil tanker and oil
terminal monitoring programs in Cook Inlet and Prince
William Sound. These programs are to involve
representatives of affected local communities in matters
that were formerly the exclusive purview of state and
federal regulators and oil industry operators.
An oil terminal roughly analogous to the TAPS terminal
at Valdez, Alaska,4 exists at Sullom Voe in the Shetland
Islands, west of Norway and to the north of Scotland in the
North Sea. The Sullom Voe terminal has had an
environmental advisory group guiding policy and operations
since its inception. The advisory group's contribution to
the operation of the Sullom Voe terminal has helped generate
an exemplary environmental record for that facility. This
contribution was recognized in the Oil Pollution Act of
19905 which mandates that a pilot program modeled after
Sullom Voe's be instituted at crude oil terminal facilities
in Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound in Alaska. The Act
also states that similar oversight programs should
eventually be established at other crude oil terminals
3. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 33 U.S.C. secs. 2731-2737.
4. The TAPS terminal at Valdez is often called the Alyeska
terminal, after the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a
consortium of oil companies organized to operate the trans-
Alaska pipeline and oil terminal.
5. Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight and
Monitoring Act of 1990 33 U.S.C. sec. 2737, (a) (2) (E-I).
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throughout the United States. The U.S. Senate became aware
of the record of Sullom Voe when Rick Steiner of Cordova,
Alaska discussed the Scottish oil terminal with Alaska
Senator Frank Murkowski soon after the Exxon Valdez spill.
It was through Senator Murkowski's staff that language
invoking the example of the Sullom Voe was included in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 6
If the example of oversight and monitoring provided by
Sullom Voe is to be effectively applied to the Alaskan
situation, an in depth analysis of the regulatory and
political differences between the national, regional and
local regimes in existence at the Alyeska and Sullom Voe
terminals is needed. Since this report is directed towards
an American audience, it will concentrate on providing the
historical background that fostered the development of model
relationships between the local community, government and
industry at Sullom Voe, and the legal milieu in the United
Kingdom that made those relationships possible. Alaskan
attempts to impose pollution control measures on oil tankers
will be outlined, as well as the history of environmental
monitoring in Alaska. Wherever appropriate, the differences
and similarities between Alaska and the Shetlands will be
noted. At this formative stage in a program of citizen
involvement in oversight and monitoring of oil
6. Thomas, B. 1991. Personal communication with Mr. Thomas,
an aide to Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski on May 14, 1991.
3
transportation in the United States, it lS important to
identify both what works well In other countries, and if
those programs have relevance to the domestic situation.
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II. The Shet1and Experience
The Shetland Island Group is located about 150 miles
north of Scotland between 59 and 61 degrees north
latitude.? Of the roughly 100 islands in the group, 17 are
inhabited. The population in 1989 was 23,214 on a land area
of 1,468 sq. kilometers (567 sq. miles).9
There are three important developments in the history
of Sullom Voe that contribute to its current reputation as a
model oil facility. The first was·an act of parliament.
The second was the establishment of the Shetland Oil
Terminal Environmental Advisory Group (SOTEAG), and its
predecessor, the Sullom Voe Environmental Advisory Group,
(SVEAG). The third development, unlike the other two, was
completely unplanned, an oil spill that occurred in 1978.
7. Schei, L. and G. Moberg. 1988. The Shetland Story
Hippocene Books, New York. p. 11.
8. Shetland Island Council. 1990. Shetland in Statistics.
Shetland Island Council Research and Development Council,
Lewrick, Shetland, U.K. pp. 5 and 12.
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A. The Zetland County Council Act of 1974
1. Historical Background
An understanding of the social and economic conditions
that existed in the Shetland Islands when oil was discovered
in the North Sea is crucial to an understanding of how the
current situation developed. While the islands' history
stretches back many thousands of years, Shetland's "modern"
period begins in 1469 when the king of Denmark, Norway and
Sweden pledged the island group to Scotland in lieu of 8,000
florins that he was unable to provide as a dowry for his
daughter. Up to that time the Shetlanders were subjects of
the Scandinavian kings, and after that time, until 1707 they
were remote and reluctant subjects of the Scots. After
1707, the year in which the Act of Union united the
parliaments of England and Scotland, the influence of their
rulers to the south began to be felt much more strongly,
mostly to the detriment of the native Shetlanders. 9
Widespread use of the Norse language finally died in the
Shetlands in the early nineteenth century, but echoes
survive in the local dialect. 1o
The purpose of this short synopsis of a rich and
complex history, is to demonstrate that government, for the
Shetlanders, has for centuries been imposed from without, by
9. Schei and Moberg, p. 47.
10. Tulloch, B. 1988. Bobby Tulloch's Shetland. Macmillan
London Ltd. London. p. 24.
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a nation that does not share their cultural heritage. This
is in marked contrast to the situation in Alaska, in which
immigrants from the lower 48 states of the u.s. over the
last century brought their strong allegiance to the federal
government and common cultural heritage along with them.
While contemporary Shetlanders do consider themselves to be
British, "it should be said that Orkney and Shetland have
traditionally been considered by their inhabitants to be
outside Scotland altogether, as part of Scandinavia."ll
2. Social and Economic Conditions
Shetland's population had gone from a high in 1861 of
31,670 to a low in 1971 of 17,670. High nineteenth century
populations had probably exceeded the carrying capacity of
the island's fishing and agricultural resources. 12 The
rural areas of the Scottish highlands and islands have
suffered a loss of population over the last century due to
declining economic opportunities, and Shetland was no
exception. 13 A reversal of fortunes however, was taking
place in the Shetlands during the late sixties and early
seventies. The popular perception in the Shetlands today is
that, due to improvements in both the fishing and knitwear
11. Kellas, J.G. 1973. The Scottish Political System.
Cambridge University Press. p. 225.
12. Schei and Moberg, p. 50.
13. Turnock, D. 1979. The New Scotland. David and Charles
Ltd. North Pomfret, Vermont. p. 18.
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sectors of the economy, it was the oil companies that needed
the Shetlands, and not the opposite.
to substantiate that perception. 14
3. The Political Framework
Current research seems
It is important to recognize that there are large
differences in the distribution of local, regional and
national authority between the United Kingdom and the United
States. Scotland, for instance, maintains a separate legal
system from the rest of the U.K. The only interface is at
the highest level of appeal, the House of Lords. 15 In the
United States, legal conflicts are subject to either
federal, state or local courts; in Scotland there is only
one set of courts, the Scottish courts. 16 Under the
current political system, Scotland retains autonomy in,
among other things, law, education, development and
planning. Further complicating the picture is the rejection
by Shetlanders of Scottish domination of local government.
In a 1973 British move to rationalize local government, it
was proposed that the Shetlands, Orkneys and Western Isles
be grouped with the sparsely settled northern areas of
14. Arnold, G. 1978. Britain's Oil. Hamish Hamilton, London.
p. 238.
15. Walker, D.M. 1981. The Scottish Legal System: an
Introduction to the Study of Scots Law. W. Green and Sons,
Edinburgh. p. 222.
16. Kellas, p. 4.
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Scotland known as the "Highlands" into one regional
governmental unit. This idea was hotly opposed in the
Shetlands. The Shetlanders were successful in their
opposition and the Zetland County Council (predecessor of
the Shetland County Council), created in 1889, was granted
full regional powers, with the exception of fire and
police. 1 ? Oil exploration in the North Sea east of the
Shetland Islands in the sixties and the announcement of
major discoveries in the early seventies prompted the County
Council to pursue legislation which would give it further
authority to protect the interests of the islanders during
the anticipated development and production phase of the
offshore oil fields.
4. A Private Bill
There are three types of bills that may be introduced
to the Parliament of the United Kingdom, public, private
and hybrid. Each of these has its own procedure. A private
bill is defined thus:
Private Bills, which are for the particular interest or
benefit of any person or body and are solicited by the
parties concerned, and deal with local or personal
matters such as giving special powers to local
authori ties, ... 19
17. Schei and Moberg, p. 167.
18. Walker, p. 227.
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Public bills affect public policy throughout the U.K., and
hybrids, as the name implies, contain elements of both of
the other two. It is through this mechanism, the private
bill, that the Shetland Islands Council (SIC) managed to
gain an extraordinary amount of power over the development
and operation of the oil terminal facility at Sullom Voe. A
bill that, according to the SIC, sufficiently protected the
interests of Shetlanders in the corning era of oil
development was submitted to Parliament in March of 1973.
Although it encountered some resistance, the bill was
eventually passed and became the Zetland County Council Act
of 1974. 19 Passage of the Act was expedited by a sense of
the urgent need to develop North Sea oil to counter the
effects of price rises and oil shortages in Britain. 20
During the initial committee hearings for this bill,
favorable testimony was given by representatives of both
British Petroleum and Shell, indicating their belief that
the SIC's cooperation was crucial to the development of the
oilfields east of the Shetlands.
powers granted by the Act are:
Some of the most important
A. Harbor Authority was granted to the Shetland
Islands Council for regulation of, among other things,
entry and departure, as well as the power to promote
19. Shetland Islands Council. 1981. Shetland's Oil Era.
Shetland Islands Council. Lerwick, Shetland, U.K. p. 14.
20. Manners, I.R. 1982. North Sea Oil and Environmental
Planning. University of Texas Press. Austin, Texas. p. 258.
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navigational rules for waters within their
jurisdiction.
B. The SIC was given the power to invest in "bodies
corporate", which enabled it to become a partner, with
the oil companies, in the development of oil
facilities.
C. The SIC gained the power to acquire land for the
purpose of developing oil facilities.
D. The SIC was given the authority to license
dredging and the construction of "Works" within the
area of Council Authority. 21
The Shetland Islands Council had acquired, through the Act,
regulatory powers that in Alaska, would be under the
jurisdiction of federal and state agencies such as the Coast
Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation. The fact that these powers
are in the hands of local authorities in the Shetlands
constitutes one of the major differences between the
regulatory regimes at the Sullom Voe and Alyeska oil
terminals. The ability of the council to enter partnerships
with private industry gives it a dimension of control over
development and operations unparalleled in the United
States.
21. Zetland County Council Act 1974, c. viii.
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5. Harbor Authority
The authority granted to the Council under the Zetland
County Council Act 1974 covers almost all aspects of port
operations, including the control of ship movements, the
right to inspect vessels and regulate the loading of
cargo. 22 The Harbor Authority is thus able to exclude
ships that do not meet port standards. This is especially
important at Sullom Voe since the oil is carried by ships of
all flags, in contrast to the situation at Alyeska, where
almost all of the vessels calling are U.S. flag. Any oil
spills that occur at the Sullom Voe terminal are the
responsibility of the terminal operator to clean up, under
the oversight of the Harbor Authority.
6. Shoreline Conservation
In addition to Harbor Authority, in its preamble the
Act gives the SIC responsibility for the entire shoreline of
the Shetlands:
it is expedient that powers be conferred on the Council
for the improvement, conservancy and development of the
coastal area. 23
The "coastal area" of the Act is defined as "the territorial
waters of the United Kingdom adjacent to the Shetland
Islands", which extend to the three mile limit. One
22. Ibid., par. 39.
23. Ibid., par. 2.
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indication that the Shetland Islands Council has taken the
conservancy of its 1,450 kilometer (900 miles) shoreline
very seriously was the institution in 1979 of aerial
surveillance of all tankers entering the port and the
general inspection of coastal waters for evidence of oil
pollution. After the Sullom Voe terminal opened in 1978,
the incidence of oiled seabirds in Shetland and the Orkneys
increased dramatically, and was connected to the illegal
discharge of crude oil tank washings at sea. The fact that
the terminal was opened before the ballast water treatment
plant was operational may have had something to do with this
situation. 24 Although the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships 1973 (Marpol 73/78) prohibits these types of
concentrated discharges, enforcement of international law
and British law was ineffective for three reasons. First
was the reliance on the offending ship's country of registry
for the enforcement of regulations against unlawful
discharges. Infractions were rarely prosecuted. Second, it
was difficult to identify polluters in busy shipping lanes,
especially if discharges are made at night. Third, the
national record of prosecutions was poor and the deterrence
24. Richardson, M., Heubeck, M., Lea, D., and P. Reynolds.
1982. "Oil Pollution, Seabirds, and operational consequences
around the Northern Isles of Scotland. Environmental
Conservation. 9, no. 4. p. 318.
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value of the fines imposed in U.K. waters was inadequate. 25
By 1982 prosecutions stemming from the aerial surveillance
program were averaging 13 per year. 26 Another step taken
by the SIC in response to these pollution incidents was to
maintain a database on all tankers trading with the terminal
in anticipation of developing a "black list" of vessels
involved in polluting incidents. Such vessels could
subsequently be barred from entry into waters under the
Harbor Authority's jurisdiction. It was proposed at the
time that the oil companies utilizing the Sullom Voe
terminal should include in their shipping contracts terms
that would prohibit the illegal dumping of oil at sea.
British Petroleum stated in 1979 that:
the regulations which we have introduced for tankers
are, we believe, the strictest ever to be applied
anywhere in the world, and we are convinced (that) they
are the most effective means of ensuring that tankers
visiting Sullorn Voe do not give rise to pollution. 27
The application of what is known under the Scottish legal
25. Abecassis, D.W., and R.L. Jarashow. 1985. Oil Pollution
from Ships: International, United Kingdom and United States
Law and Practice. Stevens and Sons, London. p. 350.
26. Anonymous, 1982. "Twice Daily Flights Spearhead Fight
Against Pollution." Offshore Engineer. October, 1982. p. 77.
27. Richardson et al., p. 319.
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system as "private law", 28 the law that applies in disputes
between individuals, to environmental practices is a unique
and possibly innovative approach. 29 Tankers approaching
the Shetlands to load oil must begin reporting their
position to the Harbor Authority when they are within 200
miles of the islands, a practice that enhances the
effectiveness of aerial surveillance.
7. The Sullom Voe Association
Two important provisions of the Zetland County Council
Act 1974 that have promoted the development of Environmental
monitoring at Sullom Voe were 1) the granting of the power
to enter into agreements with "bodies corporate" and 2) the
acquisition of the power to acquire lands for the purpose of
developing oil facilities. This enabled the SIC to form a
partnership with the oil companies·to develop port
facilities at Sullom Voe. In May of 1975 the Sullom Voe
Association (SVA) was created to construct, develop and
manage the terminal facility. The SVA ownership consisted
of 50% Shetland Islands Council, and 50% composed of the 32
oil companies that belonged to the Brent and Ninian Pipeline
28. Walker, 185.
29. A local journalist in the Shetlands, Mr. Jonathan
Wills, assured me that the use of environmental protection
clauses in the shipping contracts of the companies using
Sullom Voe contributed in a major way to the effectiveness
of the overall environmental policy of the terminal. It was
impossible to verify that point for this study.
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groups, the consortia that were building two pipelines from
different fields to the east of the Shetlands. Shell and
British Petroleum (BP) played prominent roles in the
building of the terminal, and BP was appointed terminal
operator by the two pipeline groups.30 It is through the
SVA that the Shetland Oil Terminal Environmental Advisory
Group is currently funded, and it is to the SVA that SOTEAG
channels its environmental guidance.
B. The Shetlands Oil Terminal Environmental Advisory Group
1. The Beginnings of S.V.E.A.G.
The idea of creating an environmental advisory group
was proposed to the Shetland Islands Council in 1974 by
three representatives of British Petroleum and two
university professors from Scotland. The SIC approved of
the concept and the Sullom Voe Environmental Advisory Group
(SVEAG) came into being. It consisted of representatives of
the Council and the oil industries in equal proportions, and
also included various government environmental entities. 31
During the time it was in existence, 1974 to 1976, SVEAG
performed two important missions. First, it provided a forum
for the resolution of environmental problems that developed
during the design and construction phase of the oil terminal
30. Shetland Islands Council, Shetland's Oil Era. p. 48.
31. Kingham, L. 1985. "The Marine Environment of Sullom Voe-
Monitoring in Relation to Local authority/statutory
controls" Scottish Field Studies. 9, no. 18. p. 11.
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project. Simultaneously SVEAG created a monitoring
committee which coordinated the collection of baseline data
on all aspects of the marine environment that might be
impacted by chronic or catastrophic pollution related to the
terminal. The monitoring committee also initiated an on-
going pollution monitoring program. In 1976 SVEAG
published the results of these studies in an "Environmental
Impact Assessment". 32 Also in 1976 the Shetland Islands
Council withdrew from SVEAG. The reasons for the SIC's
withdrawal were given by the planning officer for the
council, Martin Fenwick:
it was felt by the Council that industry dominance in
the make-up of the group was leading to situations
where oil industry problems rather than environmental
problems were receiving consideration. 33
SVEAG was subsequently disbanded in 1976.
2. The Role of S.O.T.E.A.G.
The gap left by the demise of SVEAG was filled in 1977
by the creation of the Shetland Oil Terminal Environmental
32. Sullom Voe Environmental Advisory Group. 1976. Oil
Terminal at Sullom Voe Environmental Impact Assessment.
Thuleprint, Sandwick, Shetland, U.K.
33. Fenwick, M. 1981. "Shetland and the Building of the
Sullom Voe Crude Oil Terminal." in The Marine Environment of
Sullom Voe and the Implications of Oil Developments:
Proceedings of the Royal society of Edinburgh. 80B, edited
by T.R. Pearson and S.O. Stanley. p. 13.
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Advisory Group. The chief changes under the new regime were
an enlarged representation of the SIC, including elected
council members, and the participation of representatives of
additional government agencies and some private,
nongovernmental groups (see appendix 1). SOTEAG was given
an independent chairman, Professor George Dunnet, one of the
original scientists who proposed the advisory group idea to
the SIC. A full time executive secretary coordinates SOTEAG
activity from an office at the university of Aberdeen. 34
As mentioned above, SOTEAG reports to, and is funded by, the
Sullom Voe Association. SOTEAG conducts a program of
monitoring designed to detect subtle or gross environmental
changes brought about by the terminal operation and tanker
traffic. The work is carried out through a monitoring
committee whose chairman is a SOTEAG member. Committee
members are chosen for their expertise from industry,
government, research groups and universities. Monitoring
programs are developed by the committee in consultation with
potential contractors and submitted to SOTEAG for approval
and funding. 35 The results of individual studies are
submitted to the monitoring committee where they are
analyzed, and an annual summary report is made to SOTEAG.
All monitoring reports, conclusions and data are available
34. Kingham, p. 12.
35. Shetland Oil Terminal Advisory Group. 1990. "SOTEAG" a
staff report. Shetland Litho, Lerwick, Shetland. U.K. p. 6.
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to the public. In the U.S. they may be obtained through the
National Technical Information Service. 36 The annual
reports, however, which are submitted to SOTEAG by the
monitoring committee, are confidential. 3? Recommendations
to the Sullom Voe Association are based on the annual report
from the monitoring committee, and also remain confidential.
SOTEAG's decisions on how to advise the Sullom Voe
Association are reached on a consensus basis.
The specific environmental concerns covered by SOTEAG
monitoring projects are chemical pollution, biological
effects, atmospheric pollution, the otter population, and
monitoring seabird populations. 3B Additional environmental
monitoring of a statutory nature is carried out by the
government and the terminal operator.
3. Why SOTEAG Works.
In the history of the advisory group, not one
environmental dispute has resulted in litigation or
36. Orders can be placed by writing the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, VA 22161.
37. Dunnet, G. 1991, Pers. comm.
38. Nineteen articles on the environment of Sullom Voe and
the Shetlands were published by the Royal Society of
Edinburgh in 1981. This Volume provides extensive
scientific background on the SOTEAG monitoring program. See
note 33. Professor Dunnet, SOTEAG's chairman, informed me
that a similar volume of monitoring results will be
published within the next two years.
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government regulatory action. 39 In a recent visit to the
Shetland Islands, an informal effort to identify groups or
individuals dissatisfied with the environmental performance
of the Sullom Voe terminal turned up very little negative
comment. One reason why this system seems to function well
is confidentiality. SOTEAG's deliberations are carried out
in an atmosphere free of two influences that tend to inhibit
frankness; fear of litigation and fear of negative
pUblicity. Another reason is that local and regional
government is well represented, along with industry and at
least a few local non-governmental groups with environmental
concerns. Probably the key factor in the smooth operation
of the advisory system is that as equal partners in the
Sullom Voe Association, the SIC exercises real power in
policy making. Since the ultimate ability to close the port
to tanker traffic rests with the Shetland Islands Council,
there is every incentive for industry to reach accommodation
on environmental issues.
C. The Esso Bernicia Spill
1. The Spill
Within its first year of operation, Sullom Voe suffered
a major oil spill during docking maneuvers at the terminal.
A new tug caught fire while assisting the 190,000 ton Esso
Bernicia into a berth. One of the other two tugs assisting
39. Dunnet, pers. comm.
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the tanker went to the assistance of the stricken tug and
the tanker drifted out of control. The tanker struck the
pier and sustained three large holes as well as a damaged
propeller. Since it was inbound at the time, it was,-Fro-t:-
----
--~
--carrying crude oil. The Spill consisted of-120a tors of
Bunker C fuel oil. 40 The major part of the oil, some 700
tons, escaped efforts to contain and recover it inside
Sullom Voe and oiled 105 km of coastline in Yell Sound, the
body of water that connects Sullom Voe to the North Sea.
Failure to contain the spill was attributed both to a lack
of preparedness for spills other than crude; and to the
general failures of containment and pumping equipment to
perform adequately. Over 3,500 seabird carcasses were
recovered; at least eleven otters died;41 and fifty sheep
that consumed oiled seaweed were killed. In light of the
Exxon Valdez devastation, this seems like minor damage, but
the reaction of the local populace was strong, and there
were calls for closing the terminal. 42 The SIC may have
considered this alternative, but they were informally
advised that the national government might then see fit to
40. Bourne, W.R.P., 1979. "Sullom Voe Comes on Flow". Marine
Pollution Bulletin. 10, no. 4. p.93.
41. Somewhat prophetically, one commentator said that the
death of the sea otters at SuI lorn Voe "has most ominous
implications for the Sea Otters of the Pacific." Bourne, p.
94.
42. Richardson, M.G. 1979. "Esso Bernicia Incident, Shetland
Dec./Jan". Marine Pollution Bulletin. 10, no. 4. p. 96.
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take over operation of the terminal. 43 This put the
council's interest in achieving consensus through compromise
on a par with industry. Problems with SIC management of
the Sullom Voe Harbour authority may have been related to
the Esso Bernicia accident. Prior to the accident both the
SIC port director and the oil pollution officer had resigned
in a dispute with the Council. The oil pollution officer
had submitted a report which had stated that "from an
ecological point of view Sullom Voe is a disaster before it
starts" . 44
2. Aftermath of the Spill
In response to the obvious failures experienced during
the Esso Bernicia spill, the SIC Harbor Authority upgraded
its port operations, especially its ability to contain oil
spills. A system of eight spur boom deployment facilities
were built along the shorelines of Sullom Voe; five to
prevent oil from escaping into Yell Sound, and three to
protect vulnerable areas within the Voe. By the mid
eighties the harbor authority had invested $20 million in
spill response equipment and maintained a full time staff of
43. Bourne, W.R.P. 1979. "Aftermath of Sullom Voe oil
Spill." Marine Pollution Bulletin. 10, no. 8. p. 87.
44. Bourne, W.R.P. "Sullom Voe Comes on Flow". p. 93.
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pollution response workers. 45 Since, as mentioned above
the terminal operator has full responsibility to clean up
its spills, the harbor authority's capacity exists in
addition to the terminal's.46 Liaison between the
terminal operator and SIC Harbor Authority for the purpose
of oil spill response planning is accomplished through the
Sullom Voe Oil Spill Advisory Committee (SVOSAC) which
prepares the harbor oil spill plan. 47 SVOSAC's members are
drawn from industry and government. SOTEAG shares members
with SVOSAC and provides them with guidance on environmental
questions.
The changes that occurred in spill prevention and
response in the first few years of Sullom Voe's operation
are certainly due in part to the Esso Bernicia spill. The
unofficial analysis, almost thirteen years later, is that
having that spill occur at that time was probably the best
thing that could have happened for the Sullom Voe operation
and Shetland.
45. Hirst, C. 1985. "Sullom Voe Spends Seven Million Pounds
to Prevent Oil Pollution". Petroleum Review. Feb. 1984. p.
6 .
46. Dickson, J. 1991. Personal interview with oil pollution
control officer for Sullom Voe Harbor Authority.
47. SOTEAG staff report. p. 13.
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III. The Alaskan Experience
In order to set the stage for an analysis of the
regulatory regime in effect over tanker traffic ln Prince
William Sound prior to 1989, it would be useful to briefly
recount the history of the legal and political battles that
were fought over the building of the pipeline. With that
history in mind, attempts that have been made to regulate
tanker traffic in state waters will be discussed, as well as
the efforts made towards environmental monitoring ln Port
Valdez and Prince William Sound during construction and
since the pipeline was completed.
A. The Valdez Oil Terminal and NEPA
The initial stirring of interest in locating an oil
terminal in Valdez, Alaska occurred at the same time that
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 48 was being
passed in Congress, the year 1969. The first Environmental
48. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
sec. 4321 et seq. (1982).
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Impact Statement (EIS), mandated by NEPA, was written in
1970 to cover the issuing of a permit by the Dept. of the
Interior to build a haul road in the pipeline corridor. The
EIS consisted of eight pages and did not mention a pipeline.
At that time the Council on Environmental Quality, a body
established by NEPA to screen government programs from the
standpoint of environmental policy, had yet to issue
guidelines for the preparation of environmental impact
statements. 49 In April of 1970 U.S. District Judge Hart
ruled that the EIS had not met the requirements of NEPA,50
and that the permit was in violation of the right-of-way
limits set in the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920. 51 In
August of 1972 Judge Hart was satisfied with a nine volume
EIS submitted by the Secretary of the Interior and approved
of steps taken to resolve the right-of-way question. His
order dissolving the injunction against permitting the
pipeline construction was stayed while an appeal was
pending. 52 In February of 1973 the U.S. Circuit court in
Washington D.C. ruled that the right-of-way was in violation
49. Lieberman, J.K. 1981. Checks and Balances: the Alaska
Pipeline Case. Lothrop, Lee and Shepard, New York. p. 36.
50. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F.Supp. 422 (D.D.C.
1970) .
51. Minerals Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. sees. 185 et
seq. (1970).
52. Judge Hart's opinion of August 15, 1972 was unrecorded.
For a detailed description see Wilderness Society v. Morton,
479 F2d.842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), p. 846.
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of the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920,53 and since Congress
would have to change that law in order for the pipeline to
be built, the NEPA issue was not yet ripe for
adjudication. 54 The Supreme court declined to review that
decision,55 so the ball was in the Congress's court.
Amending the Mineral Leasing Act to permit construction of
the pipeline was no problem, but that would leave the
problem of an EIS that could still be thrown out by the
courts. Alaska's Senator Mike Gravel came up with a novel
solution to that problem: simply amend the bill to declare
that it was a matter of Congressional pOlicy that all
actions by the federal government regarding the trans-Alaska
pipeline comply with NEPA. Since this amendment directly
contradicted the intent of recently passed legislation, it
was not overwhelmingly popular in the Senate. Still, with
the then current "energy crisis" caused by the Arab oil
embargo, there were enough votes to create, a dead heat, 49
to 49. 56 Spiro Agnew cast his vote for the amendment and
it became part of the Trans Alaska Pipeline Act5?
53. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F2d. 842 (D.C. cir.
1973) .
54. Ibid., p. 889.
55. Morton v. Wilderness Society, 479 F2d. 842 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, (1973).
56. Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, 93rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1973. Volume XXIX. "Nepa Exemption". p. 600.
57. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act 43 U.S.C. secs. 1651-1655.
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Since the construction of the pipeline terminal at
Valdez was covered by the Gravel amendment,5B and by
extension, the tanker trade to the lower forty-eight, this
meant that any review or questioning of the EIS for the
tanker traffic in Prince William Sound was effectively cut
off. The Final EIS for the transport of crude oil from
Valdez to Midland, Texas devotes two and a half pages to the
"sea leg", from Port Valdez to Cali fornia. 59 The pipeline
authorization process was predominated by the interplay of
litigation and legislation. Unlike the situation in the
Shetlands, there was very little opportunity for parties
with opposing viewpoints to interact except as adversaries
in the courts or legislature. This adversary relationship
continued through the building and operation of the pipeline
and terminal. During the building of the pipeline Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company failed to fulfill its commitments
to fund state environmental oversight positions. 60 Non-
compliance with federal and state water and air quality
standards at the Alyeska terminal has been a source of
58. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, 43 U.S.C. sec. 1652 (d)
59. U.S. Dept. of Interior. 1977. Final Environmental
Statement, Crude Oil Transportation System: Valdez, Alaska,
to Midland, Texas. (As proposed by Sohio Transportation
Company). Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of the
Interior. p. 1-31
60. Zemansky, G.M. 1976. "Environmental Non-Compliance and
the Public Interest During Construction of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline." Fairbanks Environmental Center. Sept. 1976.
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continued lawsuits since the facility was opened in 1977. 61
B. State Attempts to Minimize Oil Spill Risks
1. The Preemption Question
In the seventies a number of coastal states passed laws
that exceeded the stringency of federal laws regulating
tanker traffic, tanker structural standards, and liability
for damage claims resulting from oil spills. These laws
were quickly challenged by the oil industry and the courts
were asked to determine the extent of an individual state's
authority to regulate tanker traffic and require specific
structural standards of vessels that ply state waters. To a
great degree, the courts have found that federal legislation
has preempted the state's abilities to regulate tanker
traffic and impose structural standards,62 however, there
seems to be some room left for the assertion of state
authority. A look at some important cases will indicate the
trend.
61. Pasztor, A. and R.E. Taylor. 1985. "Unsafe Harbor:
Alaska Pipeline Firm is Accused of Polluting Sea Water Since
1977." Wall Street Journal. cXIV (35).
62. Meese, S.A. 1987. "When Jurisdictional Interests
Collide: International, Domestic, and State Efforts To
Prevent Vessel Source Pollution. Ocean Development and
International Law. 12, no. 1. p. 98.
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2. Askew v. American Waterways Operators Inc. 63
This Supreme Court decision supported the ability of
the State of Florida to recover cleanup costs in the event
of oil spills and impose no-fault liability on oil
facilities and ships. A lower court decision which
emphasized the need for uniform national maritime pollution
regulation was overturned. The principle established in
this case was that state's could exercise authority in areas
that were not preempted by federal law.
3. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company64
This case dealt with a determined attempt by the state
of Washington to regulate tanker traffic in the Straits of
Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. The Washington law required
state licensed pilots on tankers, imposed structural
standards, required tug escorts for vessels that did not
meet state structural standards (mainly double bottoms), and
imposed an absolute ban on tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT.
A district court panel ruled that all the operative
provisions of the Washington Tanker Law were preempted by
federal legislation. The lower court decision was affirmed
in part and reversed in part by the Supreme Court. The
Court found that the imposition of state structural
63. Askew v. The American Waterways Operators Inc. 93 S.Ct.
1590 (1973).
64. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978).
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standards for tankers and the ban on large tankers was
preempted by federal law, chiefly the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972. 65 The court ruled that state-licensed
pilots could be required on foreign tankers over 50,000 DWT
and that tankers that do not satisfy the state's design
provisions could be required to employ tug escorts, since
this would not conflict with existing federal regulations.
4. Chevron v. Hammond66
In 1976 the Alaska legislature passed Senate Bill 406,
a bill that attempted to establish a strong regulatory
regime for oil tankers in state waters. The bill provided
for the mandatory placement of Loran C or "other position
location systems as may be prescribed" as well as electronic
collision avoidance systems. It also prescribed that
tankers without twin screws, variable pitch propellers or a
certain capacity to apply astern propulsion be required to
employ a tug escort of a horsepower commensurate with their
size. 67 The bill provided for a "Certificate of Risk
Avoidance" required for operation of oil facilities and tank
vessels within state jurisdiction. For tankers, the cost of
65. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. sec.
1221-1227.
66. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Hammond 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.
1984) .
67. Laws of Alaska, sec. 2, ch. 266, SLA 1976 (repealed
1980) .
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the certificate would depend on their incorporation of
structural features such as double bottoms, multiple boilers
and bow thrusters. Payments for certificates would be made
into a Coastal Protection Fund to be used for oil spill
cleanup and research. 6B In 1979 U.S. District Court Judge
Fitzgerald ruled that the Alaska statute governing tanker
traffic was invalid, since it was preempted by federal
legislation,69 specifically the Ports and Waterways Safety
Aet of 1972. 70 The state decided to appeal this decision
on a very limited basis. All attempts to regulate the
tanker trade were dropped except for a state prohibition
against the discharge of ballast by oil tankers. The rest
of the provisions of Senate Bill 406 were repealed by the
legislature in 1980. 71 The 9th Circuit Court decided in
1984 that congress did not intend to preempt the state's
ability to control the discharge of ballast that had been
stored in a ship's oil tanks into state waters, and reversed
68. Croft, C. 1977. "Review of Alaskan Legislative
Response". Oil and Aguatic Ecosystems, Tanker Safety and Oil
Pollution Liability: Proceedings of the Cordova Fisheries
Institute. edited by B. Melteff. Alaska Sea Grant Report No.
77-8. AKU-W-77-002. pp. 157-164.
69. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Hammond (A77-195 Civil) F. Supp.,
(D. Alas., filed Feb. 30, 1978).
70. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. sees.
1221-1236.
71. Alaska Statutes, ch. 20, sees. 30.20.010-30.20.070.
(repealed 1980) (Cum. supp. 1980)
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the District Court's decision against the state of
Alaska. 72
5. The Current Status of State/Federal Preemption
The general thrust of these court decisions is to
establish a uniform federal system of tank vessel regulation
under the u.s. Coast Guard that would preempt state
authority within state waters.?3 Some latitude for state
action is suggested by the decisions rendered in Chevron v.
Hammond and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield. It is interesting to
speculate on how much more of Judge Fitzgerald's decision
may have been overturned on appeal, if the state had pressed
its case for tanker safety regulation. Since many of the
requirements sought by the states have been incorporated
into Oil Pollution Act of 1990 it has almost become a moot
point. In 1975 the Pacific Oil Ports Policy Group was
formed by six western states and the province of British
Columbia to push for stricter standards in the oil tanker
trade. The group was disbanded in 1977 after failing to
achieve most of its objectives in the face of oil company
72. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th cir.
1984) .
73. An excellent discussion of the evolution of U.S. law
governing oil tankers can be found in Abecassis and
Jarashow, 1985 Oil Pollution from Ships, see note 25.
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and Coast Guard opposition. 74 The recital of this history
and that of the pipeline litigation and legislation
indicates how much policy development in the U.s. depends on
the adversary process.
C. Environmental Monitoring in Prince William Sound
1. The Monitoring Record
Assembling a record of the baseline data and
environmental monitoring studies that have taken place in
Port Valdez and Prince William Sound prior to and since the
building of the pipeline and oil terminal is a difficult
task. Unlike the coordinated and sustained effort made by
SVEAG and SOTEAG at Sullom Voe, most of the baseline and
monitoring studies in Alaska were one time projects, often
unconnected with each other. What follows is an account of
the more important studies.
2. Port Valdez
The most comprehensive baseline study of Port Valdez
was begun in 1971 by the Institute of Marine Science (IMS)
of the University of Alaska. The study was initially
sponsored by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to
determine the impact of treated ballast water on Port
Valdez. As the study progressed additional funding was
74. Parker, W.B. 1989. "State of Alaska Efforts on oil
Tanker Safety and Oil Spill Limitation from 1974 to 1978."
State of Alaska, Oil Spill Information Center. p. 4.
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provided by the Sea Grant Program and the National Science
Foundation. 75 The study did a creditable job of describing
the physical oceanography and biological processes of Port
Valdez. The study lasted 15 months and was completed ln
1972. This project did not include surveys of the
intertidal zone. Two intertidal surveys were carried out in
1977, one by two BP scientists for Alyeska,76 and one by
the IMS. 77 A study was conducted by the National Marine
Fisheries Service lab at Auk Bay, Alaska on variations in
the distribution of the clam Macoma balthica, a potential
indicator of environmental stress. 7B The only long term
biological monitoring program in Port Valdez seems to have
been studies on the mussel Mytilus edulis and the clam
Macoma balthica. This program was funded by Alyeska and the
state of Alaska. 79 In a paper presented at a symposium on
75. Hood, D.W., W.E. Shiels and E.J. Kelley, (eds.) 1973.
Environmental Studies of Port Valdez. Institute of Marine
Science, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
76. Monk, D.C. and E.B. Cowell. 1977. "A Baseline Ecological
Survey of the Intertidal Zone of Port Valdez, Alaska." BP
Report for Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.
77. Feder, H.M., G.J. Mueller and G.E. Keiser. 1977. "A
Study of the Intertidal Region of Port Valdez, Prince
William Sound, Alaska." Institute of Marine Science,
University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
78. Pella, J.J. and R.T. Myren. 1977. "Natural Variability
in Distribution of an Intertidal Population of Macoma
balthica Subject to Potential Oil Pollution at Valdez."
Marine Biology 41, no. 4, pp. 371-382.
79. Shaw, D.G., T.E. Hogan and D.J. McIntosh. 1986.
"Hydrocarbons in Bivalve Mollusks of Port Valdez, Alaska:
Consequences of five Years Permitted Discharge." Estuarine,
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Sullom Voe at the Royal Society of Edinburgh, BP scientist
E.B. Cowel1 80 expressed frustration with the lack of
understanding of "those environmental factors which
principally control the communities studied." in Port
Valdez. He also expressed hope that the 14 sites he
surveyed would be re-surveyed at regular intervals, and
sites outside Port Valdez would be included in the
future. 81 His hopes were apparently unrealized. While the
individual studies mentioned here are laudable, the emerging
picture of monitoring effort could only be described as
modest when compared with the program in place at Sullom
Voe.
2. Studies in Prince William Sound
With one exception, very little collection of baseline
data and virtually no environmental monitoring had been
carried out in Prince William Sound along the route of the
tankers that carry oil from Valdez to the lower forty-eight.
That one exception is the program of environmental
assessment carried out in Alaska's ocean and coastal regions
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for
Coastal and Shelf Science. 23, pp. 863-872.
80. Mr. Cowell is also one of three persons from BP who
proposed setting up the original environmental advisory
group to the Shetland Islands Council.
81. E.B. Cowell and D.C. Monk, 1981. "Problems in Ecological
Monitoring in Port Valdez, Alaska." Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh. See note 33. p. 364.
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the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the
Interior. This assessment was made in anticipation of the
exploration of sites on Alaska's outer continental shelf for
oil and gas deposits. While this project, called the Outer
Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEAP)
examined many aspects of the entire Gulf of Alaska
ecosystem, one of its many studies surveyed the biology and
ecology of specific intertidal and subtidal sites throughout
the Gulf. Five sites in Prince William Sound were included
in biogeographical surveys of 29 sites in the Gulf of
Alaska, from Yakutat to Shemya, in the Aleutian Islands. 82
This study, along with general seabird, marine mammal and
fisheries studies undertaken by OCSEAP greatly expanded our
knowledge of coastal ecosystems in the Gulf. Publication of
the study came almost ten years after the opening of the oil
terminal at Valdez, but fortunately it preceded the Exxon
Valdez spill by three years, providing at least minimal
baseline data for the assessment of damage from that spill.
82. O'Clair, C.E. and S.T. Zimmerman. 1986. "Biogeography
and Ecology of Intertidal and Shallow Subtidal Communities."
in The Gulf of Alaska: Physical Environment and Biological
Resources. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Gov. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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rv. Different Regulatory Philosophies
In addition to the large differences in national,
regional and local authority over regulatory matters at
Alyeska and Sullom Voe, a fundamental difference in
philosophy exists between the United States and the United
Kingdom in the field of environmental hazard regulation.
Before discussing the applicability of Sullom Voe's example
to Alyeska, it might be useful to look at some of the
manifestations of this difference ..
1. Environmental Groups
Environmental activism has never achieved the same
levels in Britain that it has in the United States. B3 In
the U.S. environmental groups receive a large amount of
popular support, but do not have the same kind of access to
powerful federal agencies and congressional committees that
their counterparts in industry have. The result is that
83. Manners, I.R. 1982. North Sea Oil and Environmental
Planning. University of Texas Press. Austin, Texas. p. 244.
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litigation is often the primary means used to force
reluctant regulatory agencies to enforce environmental
legislation. Traditionally the influence of environmental
groups in the U.K. has relied upon the prestige and status
of their executive members. 84 In the U.K. environmental
organizations that do not have access to policy forming
groups through their leadership have little hope of
influencing government programs. While environmental groups
in the U.s. may have more access than those in the U.K. to
the process of lawmaking, they often lack the resources that
are available to their opponents to influence legislation.
2. Civil Service
An important difference to keep in mind is that when a
new British government is formed, this does not mean the
wholesale expulsion and replacement of top level
bureaucrats, as it does in the United States.
analyst characterized the situation this way.
In fact, one
"When a new
party comes to power in Britain, only about a hundred
politicians move into Whitehall to run the 800,000 civil
servants. " . 85 Civil servants in the U. K. enjoy a good deal
84. Ibid.
85. Enloe, C.H. 1975. The Politics of Pollution in a
Comparative Perspective. David McKay Company Inc., New York.
p. 302.
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more prestige than their counterparts in the U.S. B6
British Industry is regularly and openly involved in the
regulatory process, enabling bureaucrats to build up long
term relationships with their counterparts in industry, a
situation which sometimes limits their regulatory
effectiveness. B? One analyst ascribes the comparative
success of the British system to both a willingness by
industry to accept controls, and a willingness by the public
to tolerate industry-government cooperation. BB
3. Confidentiality or Secrecy
A major characteristic of the way that the business of
government is conducted in the U.K. is secrecy. There is no
equivalent to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act in the
U.K. This has encouraged a regulatory process in which
consensus is reached between industry and government behind
closed doors. This form of regulation has been unraveling
in recent years,B9 but a strong tradition of
confidentiality remains. The principles of consensus and
86. Vogel, D. and V. Kun, 1987. "The Comparative Study of
Environmental Policy: A Review of the Literature". in
Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience.
edited by M. Dierkes, R.N. Weiler and A.B. Antal. St.
Martins Press, New York. p. 128.
87. Enloe, p. 303.
88. Vogel and Kun, p. 128.
89. Waite, A.J. 1990. "An English Perspective of U.S. and
U.K. Environmental Regulation." Natural Resources &
Environment. 5, no. 1. p. 34.
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compromise are invoked by the defenders of the confidential
approach to negotiations over environmental matters. The
ability of all parties to speak frankly, without the
pressure of the press or the likelihood of litigation is
seen as a necessary condition for policy development. In
the United States any form of secrecy in the process of
forming public policy is immediately suspect. There is a
strong tendency for some kind of adversary relationship to
develop, either between government and industry, or between
environmental groups on one side, and government along with
industry on the other.
4. Litigation vs. Compromise
Many environmental battles in the United States are
fought in the courts. In Britain resorting to the legal
system is seen as a failure in the process, to be vigorously
avoided. As one official of the Nature Conservancy,90 put
it: "Egged on in the witness box by a committed lawyer,
otherwise responsible scientists can be persuaded to lie, or
at least to exaggerate or select their evidence. It is the
environment which suffers.".91 A major difference between
the U.S. and U.K. is the sheer volume of environmental laws
that have been passed in the U.S. In recent years the trend
90. The Nature Conservancy of the U.K. is an organization
created by parliament to oversee nature reserves and advise
the government on environmental issues. Manners, p. 305.
91. Enloe, p. 283.
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has been for more environmental legislation in the U.K., but
the tendency remains not to occupy the field completely,
leaving some discretion to regulatory bodies. 92 Unlike
the U.S. there is very little access for citizen's
environmental suits in the British system. The principle of
locus standi 93 is severely restricted in comparison with
the U.S., although that too may be changing in Britain.
92. Waite, p. 34.
93. The principle of locus standi concerns the ability of
individual citizens or groups to bring suit under specific
laws. See Waite, p. 34.
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V. Recommendations and Summary
A. Recommendations
1. Harbor Authority
While the example of Sullom Voe has demonstrated the
effectiveness of a locally controlled harbor authority,
political realities make the prospect remote in Alaska. As
the pollution control officer for the SIC harbor authority
stressed in his report to the Alaskan Regional Citizen's
Advisory Council (RCAC), it is crucial to establish a single
authority for the safety of navigation in Prince William
Sound. 94 For the foreseeable future, that authority will
be the Coast Guard. It will be extremely important for the
citizen's councils to keep abreast of developments in Coast
Guard policy nationally and to maintain a strong working
relationship with local Coast Guard representatives.
94. Dickson, J. 1991. "Oil Spill Prevention Guidelines for
Prince William Sound." Draft Report no. 2. Prepared for
Regional Citizen's Advisory Council. p. 1.
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2. Access for Concerned Citizens
The exclusion of individuals and groups from the policy
making process often leads the excluded parties to
litigation as their only recourse to influence policy. A
genuine voice in responsible and effective citizen's
oversight should create a more constructive role for those
who were formerly cut off from the decision making process.
Another quote from one of the architects of SOTEAG
underscores the obligation of citizen's oversight councils
to be widely representative of community concerns:
The group by its nature has tended to subdue the voice
of individual interests. It will be remembered that I
indicated that a reason for the Council's withdrawal
from S.V.E.A.G was a feeling that environmental
problems were being manipulated. I hope - I should say
I believe - that suggesting the establishment of the
environmental group was not the most serious
manipulation of all. I say that because the very
existence of the group in my view has dampened the
evolution of healthy environmental pressure groups
which one may have expected normally to have evolved in
a situation of this type. I believe that this function
must be consciously developed by the group itself or
encouraged in others, even granting this may cause
considerable difficulty to the representatives on the
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group of government departments. 95
3. Direct Negotiations
One of the key features of SOTEAG is that members
representing divergent interests have an opportunity to
negotiate policy recommendations face to face, and are
expected to reach compromise solutions that all sides will
support (see appendix 1). In setting up an oversight
system, the Oil Pollution Act 96 established a two level
system in which local government and nongovernmental
representatives do not interact directly with
representatives of industry. The first level of oversight
will consist of federal, state and industry representatives.
Since the second level's (the council's) voting membership
consists entirely of local government and nongovernmental
representatives, with a non-voting contingent from state and
federal government, council processes will not result in the
kind of direct negotiation between local interest groups and
industry that has proven successful in the Shetlands. The
formal procedure for submitting council recommendations to
the association and requiring written notice when
recommendations are rejected may foster a process of
95. Fenwick, M. former Chief Planning Officer for the SIC.
See note 33.
96. Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight and
Monitoring Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. sec. 2732.
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divisive posturing by all parties. 97 While the current
structures may exclude the possibility of direct dialogue
between industry and local interest groups, informal
dialogue should be encouraged, and the possibility of future
structural changes explored.
4. The Role of Science
An important component of the SOTEAG system of
environmental monitoring is the inclusion at the highest
level of independent scientists. Since council members will
be asked to assess highly technical information that, in
many cases, they will not have the background to digest, the
benefits of placing impartial and well respected
representatives of the academic community in leadership
positions are obvious. It is important that scientists
participate directly in council deliberations, and not be
relegated to advisory status. 98
B. Summary
Substantial differences exist between the British and
American approach to regulating environmentally hazardous
activities. In the Shetland Islands strong local control
over vessel traffic and safety has resulted, after some
97. Ibid., sec. 2732 (h).
98. Dunnet, G. 1991. Personal communication with Professor
Dunnet, March 10, 1991
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trial and error, in an acceptable environmental record for
an oil terminal. While this regulatory situation cannot be
duplicated in Alaska without a major reshaping of federal
maritime policy, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 offers an
opportunity for local citizens to exercise a voice in this
field for the first time. The responsible exercise of this
voice could make the crucial difference in preventing future
tanker accidents. The role of citizen's oversight groups in
coordinating scientific monitoring is easily translated from
Sullom Voe to Alyeska, and the need is obviously pressing.
Probably the most promising prospect presented by the
implementation of citizen's oversight under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 is the opportunity to minimize the
role of adversary disputes in the creation of environmental
policy and practice for oil terminals and tanker traffic.
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APPENDIX I
SOTEAG MEMBERS
University of Aberdeen (Chairman)
University of Aberdeen (Vice Chairman)
Shetland Islands Council (2)
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland*
Ninian Pipeline System
Brent Pipeline System
Nature Conservancy Council*
Countryside Council for Scotland*
HM Industrial pollution Inspectorate, Scottish Development
Dept.*
Shetland Fishermen's Association
Shetland Bird Club
Aberdeen University Research and Industrial Services Ltd.
(secretary)
OBSERVERS
oil Pollution Control Officer, Shetland Islands Council
Pollution Control Superintendent, Sullom Voe Terminal
Director of Planning, Shetland Islands Council
Scottish Agricultural Colleges
Environmental Officer, Sullom Voe Terminal
Nature Conservancy Council, Shetland*
Director of Environmental Health, Shetland Islands Council
Process Engineering Superintendent, Sullom Voe Terminal
THE MONITORJ:NG COMMITTEE
Membership is based on the individual expertise of the
member, not in the institution that is represented
(S.O.T.E.A.G., 1990).
The Chairman is appointed from SOTEAG
The Dept. of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland*
Shell Exploration and Production
Shetland Island Council
The Nature Conservancey Council*
The Sullom Voe Terminal
HM Industrial Inspectorate, Scottish qevelopment Dept.*
National Environmental Research Council, Institute of
Terrestrial Ecology*
Seas Ltd
* Organizations or agencies of the national or regional
government.
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